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The Plain Meaning of the Automatic Stay
in Bankruptcy: The Void/Voidable
Distinction Revisited
TIMOTHY ARNOLD BARNES*
"Most of the disputes in the world arise from words."
Morgan v. Jones, Lofft 160, 176, 98 Eng. Rep. 587, 596 (K.B. 1773) (Murray, C.J.).
"There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally..."
Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, Learned, J.,
concurring), aff'd sub nom. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
I. INTRODUCTION
History has shown us that there is nothing more enduring than discussions
about semantics. Indeed, it appears that no discipline is immune from the
philology debate.I The academic pursuit of law is no different. "Therefore, it is
desirable in any study of law to work with the words and concepts that
jurisprudence has given us-insofar as this is possible."2 In the relatively
young area of federal bankruptcy code interpretation, the legal community is
faced with the sometimes insurmountable task of determining congressional
intent in light of the words actually chosen by the legislature. As one might
expect, the process can sometimes be frustrating and is rarely exact.
* I would like to thank Professor Nancy B. Rapoport for her assistance with this
project. Defects, if any, are attributable to me alone. I would also like to thank my family
for their support.
1 A researcher in any field must begin with the language:
"Language and our thought-grooves are inextricably interwoven, are, in a sense,
one and the same." Thinking is done within the framework of a pre-existing language.
But as the researcher widens the scope of knowledge or sharpens down a point, he
finds inevitably that old words must have their meanings altered or that new words must
be hammered out to encompass new phenomena that are too different to be embraced in
old words or concepts.
E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW Oi' PRIMTvE MAN 19 (1954) (quoting EDWARD SAPIR,
LANGUAGE 232 (1939)).
21Id.
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Since Congress enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act (hereinafter "the
Bankruptcy Code" or "the Code"), 3 academics and practitioners alike have
engaged in much discussion over the Bankruptcy Code's purpose4 and, in
particular, how that purpose is to be realized in the enforcement of the Code's
specific terminology.5 Methods of analysis vary, but recently the legal
community has paid much attention to the Rehnquist Court's "plain meaning"
approach to legislative analysis. 6 As to whether this approach is of any
assistance in helping to resolve many of the still lingering issues in bankruptcy
law, the jury is still out.7 It is beyond the scope of this Note to examine the
competing theories with any detail, and it would be a disservice to their
proponents for me to offer them only lip service here. Accordingly, I will
restrict my analysis to the plain meaning approach and to only the limited area
of the automatic stay.
3 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (1994)); see infra part I.
4 See especially the debate between Professors Douglas G. Baird and Elizabeth Warren
in the Summer 1987 issue of the University of Chicago Law Review. Douglas G. Baird,
Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply To Warren, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 815, 831-34 (1987) (seeing bankruptcy as a tool for "crediting priorities among
creditors"); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cmu. L. REv. 775, 777 (1987)
(taking the position that bankruptcy law exists to distribute the debtor's loss amongst
multiple entities).
5 See generally Martin N. Flics & Melissa J. Cassedy, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 As Amended: An Overview, in BAsic BusINEss BANKRUprCY 1991, at 7 (PLI Com. L.
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 574, Order No. A4-4336, 1991).
6 According to one author, debate has varied over whether the "proper method of
statutory interpretation is plain-meaning, legislative intent, dynamic interpretation, social
purpose, common law-like development or some other theory." Thomas G. Kelch, An
Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10 BANKR. Day. J. 289,
292 (1994) (positing that "there are characteristics of the Bankruptcy Code that lend
themselves to plain-meaning analysis"). Like Professor Kelch, I believe that the Bankruptcy
Code should be interpreted in the fight of the plain meaning standard, but not because of
some characteristics which inhere to the Code in particular. Rather, I believe that any
legislative or linguistic analysis must have a starting point, and there is simply no other
logical place to begin than at the beginning, and with language that is with its plain
meaning. For a more in-depth analysis of the plain meaning approach to bankruptcy
jurisprudence, see infra parts V & VI.
7 See Walter A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court's Evolving
"Plain Meaning" Approach to Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 SEToN HALL L. REv. 1636,
1761-62 (1993); see also infra part VI.
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Many commentators agree that the current Code provides chiefly debtor
relief (the ubiquitous "fresh start" 8), with creditor's rights existing only
appurtenant to this purpose.9 Opinions may vary as to how these goals are to
be accomplished, but none dispute that at the center of this debate is the issue
of the automatic stay.10 The automatic stay protects both debtors and creditors.
Debtors are protected by gaining the oversight of the court in matters of
prepetition debt." Creditors benefit in that no individual creditor can improve
its position at the expense of the remaining ones, once the bankruptcy petition
has been filed, without getting the court's permission first.12 Such protection,
however, is conditioned on the desire that creditors will cease and desist their
usurial ways when faced with the possibility of judicial sanction. 13 In the true
fashion of nearsighted legislation, 14 however, Congress neglected to define
8 See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV.
L. REv. 1393 (1985).
9 See BRiAN A. BLUM, BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR/CREDrroR § 10.3 (1993) (pointing
out, however, that this is a recent reversal of priorities); Jackson, supra note 8; cf THOMAS
H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LImrrs OF BANKR uPTCY LAw 5 (1986) (stressing the
administrative efficiency goals of the Bankruptcy Code); Sheryl L. Scheible, Bankruptcy
and the Modification of Support: Fresh Start, Head Start, or False Start?, 69 N.C. L. REv.
577 (1991).
10 "Section 362 is the linchpin of the modem Bankruptcy Code." The Honorable
William T. Bodoh, Remarks to Prof. Nancy B. Rapoport's Debtor/Creditor class at the
Ohio State University College of Law (Nov. 22, 1994).
11 See Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc. (In re Fidelity Mortgage
Investors), 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that without the automatic stay, what we
have is "a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor's assets in a variety of
uncoordinated proceedings in different courts"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977). Even
so, debtors do not go lightly into bankruptcy. "To encourage voluntary-
participations... we develop a system that balances opportunities and risk for the debtor."
Elizabeth Warren, Why Have a Federal Bankruptcy System?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1093,
1096 (1992).
12 "[B]ankruptcy disputes are better characterized as creditor-versus-creditor, with
competing creditors struggling to push the losses of default onto others." Warren, supra
note 4, at 785; see also BLUM, supra note 9, § 16.1 ("Since time immemorial, dogs have
responded to the command 'stay' by resting on their behinds and forgoing intended
activity.").
13 "Once a bankruptcy case has been filed, parties seeking to litigate against the debtor
outside the bankruptcy court... act at their own peril." Henry J. Sommer, The Automatic
Stay Packs a Punch, FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1992, at 50, 52.
14 For a good overview of the pros and cons of the legislative process, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal
Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 691 (1987).
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what-other than the monetary sanctions of § 362(h)-would result if creditors
failed to respect the stay.15
In this Note, I will examine the instances when a creditor acts in violation
of the automatic stay. Part II examines the motivation for having a federal
bankruptcy system, as it is there that the rules of interpretation begin to take
shape. The dimensions of the automatic stay in the Bankruptcy Code are
outlined in Part Ill, including how a creditor, seemingly outside the dimensions
of the automatic stay, can find herself unknowingly in trouble. Part IV
examines the distinction between "void" and "voidable" acts in areas of the
law outside of bankruptcy. After viewing the void and voidable doctrines in
other legal realms, Part V will then examine the plain meaning approach to
legal language both in general and in the specific instance of federal
bankruptcy. Part VI will suggest a resolution to the void/voidable debate that
serves the needs of the participants in federal bankruptcy, including unwitting
participants. It is my contention that this solution is the only satisfactory one,
and that it is consistent with the plain meaning approach to legislative
interpretation.
II. THE HISTORY AND GOALS OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
In a perfect world, language would be unambiguous. 16 Of course, in this
conception of a perfect world, many lawyers would therefore be unemployed.
Should this observation seem cynical, let me be quick to remind you of what
most would agree upon-that this not a perfect world, language can still be
deceptive, and bankruptcy protection is still necessary.17 Being residents in an
15 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1994). In an era where legislators win or lose their seats by
their stands on financial issues, this is hardly surprising. See infra part M.D for a discussion
of§ 362(h).
16 Any self-respecting linguist would take umbrance with such a flippant remark. It
presupposes that language exists only to convey meaning. Even if that were so, this still
presumes there is no value in ambiguity. See MAX BLACK, THE LABYRINTH OF LANGUAGE
63 (1968) ("The words a speaker uses in an utterance are one thing; the thought 'behind the
words' is another. The words may be adequate or inadequate to the thought; the speaker
may wish to conceal at least part of his thought; and so on."). Philosophers, however, are
usually not so open-minded. See S. Cavell, Must We Mean Wat We Say?, in PHILOSOPHY
AND LINGuISTICS 131, 138-39 (Colin Lyas ed., 1971) ("[Ulnless what I say is flatly false or
unless I explicitly contradict myself, it is pointless to suggest that what I say is wrong or that
I must mean something other than I say .... ").
17 For an interesting analysis of the problems underlying bankruptcy policymaking
(and the inspiration for this discussion), see Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in
an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336 (1993). More to the point of the linguistic
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imperfect world, however, we are faced with the task of trying to eliminate
ambiguity from the Bankruptcy Code. Such an endeavor is impossible without
at least some basic understanding of the goals of federal bankruptcy. These
goals, in turn, are not self-evident. 18 Congressional intent can be determined in
at least three ways: (1) an exploration of past bankruptcy legislation and the
intent thereof, if discernible; (2) an examination of the current Code's
legislative history; and (3) an analysis of the language used in the statute and its
accepted legal import. I will briefly examine the first two here and then revisit
them when investigating the third in Parts V & VI. 19
The federal bankruptcy system traces its justification and empowerment to
the Constitution.20 The current Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978,21
repealing the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.22 The previous Bankruptcy Act was by
far the most resilient attempt by Congress to exercise its constitutional
authority. Prior to the Act, Congress enacted and repealed three short-lived
Acts-the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,2 3 the Bankruptcy Act of 1841,24 and the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867.25 In contrast, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 survived
with only one major amendment, the Chandler Act of 1938,26 until its repeal in
1978. Since 1978, the Bankruptcy Code has gone through significant reforms
in 1984,27 198628 and most recently in 1994.29 Despite this consistent
analysis here, Professor Warren recognizes that linguistic interpretation may extend to her
own writings and makes a conscious choice to keep her style simple. Id. at 338.
18 Baird, supra note 4, at 816-22.
19 See infra parts V & VI.
20 "The Congress shall have Power... [tro establish... uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States .... " U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see Flics
& Cassedy, supra note 5, at 32. Through the operation of preemption, there is no state
bankruptcy law. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439-44 (1940). Accordingly, I use
the terms "federal bankruptcy" and "bankruptcy" interchangeably throughout this Note.
21 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (1994)).
22 Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976 & Supp.
I 1977), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
23 Ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800), repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.
24 Ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841), repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614
(repealed only 18 months after enactment).
25 Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
26 Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840-940 (1938).
27 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 (1984) (enacted to correct jurisdictional defects in the Bankruptcy Code, as
identified in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982)).
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intervention by Congress, gleaning the intent of the Code is still not possible
from the previous or current statutes themselves, but instead involves
exploration of the Code's legislative history.30
In the deliberation process prior to the enactment of the Code, the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States31 expressly
identified two functions of the bankruptcy process: "to continue law-based
orderliness" in the face of the debtor's inability to pay his debts; 32 and the
rehabilitation of debtors, "i.e., to provide a meaningful 'fresh start.'" 33 Within
these two functions, the Commission empathized with the two possible
perspectives, the debtor's need for protection from "the jungle of creditors'
pursuit of their individualistic collection efforts" and the creditor's need for
"rules that determine rights generally in the debtor's wealth." 34
A. Protection of the Debtor
Probably the most important debtor-protective device in bankruptcy is the
automatic stay, which, beginning at filing, provides a "freeze" for a limited
28 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (among other things, enacting Chapter 12 of the
Bankruptcy Code).
29 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106. Once again,
Congress failed to grant bankruptcy courts Article III status, despite the recommendations of
some of the finest scholars in the field. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFE.RENcE's CODE
REvIEWPROJECr, REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 44-49 (Final Report, May 1, 1994).
30 Warren, supra note 17, at 355 n.45 ("Congressional intent is always a slippery
concept.... ."). General trends are, however, easier to detect. It is my assertion that the
initial federal bankruptcy acts were enacted in the tradition of creditor protection. The term
bankruptcy itself "is derived from the statutes of Italian city-states, where it was called
banca rupta after a medieval custom of breaking the bench of a banker or tradesman who
absconded with the property of his creditors." JACKSON, supra note 9, at 1 (citing Israel
Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 HARV.
L. REv. 189 (1938)). As previously discussed, the Bankruptcy Code at its inception was
primarily a debtor remedy. The 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act appears to be an indication
that the pendulum has swung back the other way. For an example of this change in attitude,
see the 1994 Act's treatment of the single-asset real estate cases. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(51B),
362(d) (as amended by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108
Stat. 4106).
31 COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws oF =H UNITED STATES, H.R. DOc. No.
137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 84 (1973).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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time, on the relationships between the debtor and the creditor(s).35 The closest
analogy is probably the yellow flag in racing: cars cannot change position until
the flag is withdrawn (and this period while the flag is operative provides an
ideal opportunity to "pit" and refresh). As we shall see below, this protection is
neither all-encompassing nor unassailable, but remains the principal protection
available to the debtor in the bankruptcy.
Debtors may also control to some extent which items of the debtor's
property become property of the estate. 36 Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code
allows the debtor to exempt certain property from property of the estate.37 "An
exemption is a right granted to an individual debtor to protect certain types or
items of property from seizure in satisfaction of debt."38 For example, under
the federal bankruptcy exemptions, a debtor may exempt up to $2,400 in the
value of one motor vehicle. 39 The power to exempt effectively allows the
debtor to reduce the balance available to creditors, yet retain items that may
have been purchased with their credit. That these exemptions are not automatic,
but elective, gives the debtor the power to negotiate on their use, an additional
debtor-protective device.
Various other devices exist,40 but the greatest protection available to
debtors is not necessarily a device, rather the end result of many bankruptcy
35 Discussed infra part IlL See also supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
36 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994) defines what prepetition assets of the debtor the creditor
may reach with bankruptcy powers. Prepetition property is within the scope of any filing
under Title 11. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994) ("[C]hapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a
case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this title."). Postpetition property is generally only
property of the estate under Chapters 12 and 13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1207, 1306 (1994).
37 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994). Actually, what is specifically exempted may be a creature
of state law as § 522 expressly authorizes states to "opt-out" of the federal bankruptcy
exemptions contained in § 522(d). See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1994).
38 BLuM, supra note 9, § 9.3.
39 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (1994). This does not necessarily mean that the debtor may
keep her automobile. The net result of such an exemption is that the debtor may completely
exempt from the bankruptcy estate one automobile, if the value of the automobile is less
than $2,400 (this amount may increase if the debtor applies the "wildcard" exemption in
§ 522(d)(5)). If, however, the value of the automobile in question is greater than the
aggregate of exemptions applicable to it, the automobile must be sold, and the cash amount
of the applicable exemptions is exempt from the bankruptcy estate. See BLuM, supra note 9,
§ 19.8, at 295-97.
40 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1978, as amended) (stipulating the debtor's right to
convert a Chapter 11 filing to another Chapter). Other Chapters have similar, but more
expansive, conversion rights for the debtor.
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filings, discharge.41 Discharge is "[t]he debtor's release from liability for the
unpaid balance of all debts... that are not excluded from discharge under the
Code." 42 Discharge is available at the confirmation of the plan of
reorganization or the completion of the obligations thereunder, depending on
the Chapter.43 For those filings that make it to discharge, its protection is
almost absolute. For those cases not yet there, and those that never make it to
discharge, the automatic stay remains the strongest protective device.
B. Protection of the Creditor
Almost every protection granted the debtor may also be interpreted as
protecting the creditor.44 For example, while the individual creditor may be
stayed from pursuing her claim, she may rest assured other creditors are in no
better position. Thus, the feeding frenzy that might otherwise arise around the
debtor, like vultures around carrion, is prevented from occurring, and even the
weakest creditor is guaranteed at least some chance at the spoils. 45
Creditors have the power to institute the bankruptcy proceedings without
the consent of the debtor, thus creating the aptly named "involuntary"
bankruptcy.46 The power to bring involuntary cases is limited by the number
and type of creditors and the amount of debt owed each. 47
41 say "many" because some bankruptcy filings do not make it to this stage. See
generally TERESA A. SuLLivAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OuR DEBTORS (1989) (discussing a
socio-legal study of consumer debtors).
42 BLuM, supra note 9, at 530. Discharge is a "legislatively created benefit, not a
constitutional one." United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973).
43 Discharge is Chapter specific. Chapter 11 discharge becomes available at the
confirmation of the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1994). Chapter 7 discharge is automatic after
the expiration of the time for objections to the plan. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c). Both
Chapters 12 and 13 provide for discharge only on the completion of payments under the
plans. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228, 1328 (1994), respectively.
44 For a concise summary-aimed at the nonbankruptcy attorney-of creditors' rights,
see LYNN M. LoPuCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREmrroas iN BANKRuircU PRocIoS (1985 &
Supp. 1990).
45 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. "One of the major purposes of the
bankruptcy system is to provide a more efficient and effective method of liquidating
debtors' assets when necessary." LoPUcKI, supra note 44, at 11.
46 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1994). This section does not permit the bringing of an involuntary
case in Chapters 12 or 13. Id. § 303(a). Once the involuntary petition has been filed, the
debtor may always exercise her limited right of conversion. See supra note 40.
47 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1994).
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In addition, once the petition has been filed, creditors may, through the
powers of the bankruptcy trustee, rely on state fraudulent transfer laws48 and
avoidance of preferences 49 to undo certain transactions made prior to filing.
These allow the bankruptcy estate to recapture funds that may have been
pressured out of the debtor by overzealous creditors or insiders. Thus, as in the
case of the automatic stay and creditors, these powers may be seen as
protective to debtors.
C. Orderliness
Achieving protection for debtors and creditors alike must be done in light
of the overriding function of the bankruptcy process-an orderly process of
dispute resolution.50 Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the
bankruptcy law was considered unmanageable, at least by the proponents of
change.51 This opinion was apparently shared by the public at large, for the
advent of the Code "led to nearly a 60 percent increase in bankruptcy filings"
from 1979 to 1980.52
Preserving orderliness benefits both creditors and debtors as it ensures that
the protections offered above will be predictable and reliable.
E. THBE AuToMATIc STAY IN BANKRUPTCY
The Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions are contained in § 362,
which states in part, that "a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
48 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
49 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994). The recovery period is 90 days before filing for non-
insiders and up to one year prior for insiders. Note that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
reverses the previous judicially made law (the "Deprizio" case, Levit v. Ingersoll Rand
Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1989)) that payments made to non-
insiders before the 90-day period were recoverable if made for the benefit of an insider. ld.
§ 550(c).
50 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
51 "The Bankruptcy Act is a mess. The kindest statement is that the Bankruptcy Act
was not written to be read aloud." Douglas R. Rendleman, Bankruptcy Revision Procedure
and Process, 53 N.C. L. REv. 1197, 1201 (1975) (Rendleman portrays pre-Code
bankruptcy law as an unsuccessful adversary process that was "complicated, protracted, and
expensive." Id. at 1203-05.
52 Ronald M. Martin, Creditor Alternatives to Obtain Relieffrom Automatic Stays in
Bankruptcy, 98 BANKiGNL.J. 525, 525 (1981).
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title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities... .. 53 These provisions
were not new to federal bankruptcy law, but offered a more laconic approach
to debtor protection than had been previously taken.54 The legal nature of stays
in general is unclear, and this opacity will have a direct result in our "plain
meaning" approach in Part V and its application in Part VI. 5
Regardless of its true nature, the automatic stay is unquestionably one of
the most-if not the most-important elements of bankruptcy. 56 In order to
better understand the stay, I will examine it in terms of when it applies and
who and what is or is not affected. Next, I will examine the instances where the
stay is suppressed. Finally, without examining the legal nature of the violations
themselves, I will examine the statutory ramifications of violating the stay.
A. When the Automatic Stay Applies
The protection in § 362 is triggered automatically by the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. 57 Notice is not necessary for the stay to be effective
53 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). As previously mentioned, Chapter 3 applies to Chapters
7, 11, 12 and 13 of Title 11. See supra note 36. Thus, the stay applies in all cases filed
under Title 11.
54 The origin and application of the automatic stay in federal bankruptcy law is
discussed in great detail in a series of articles by Professor Kennedy. See Frank R.
Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 175 (1978)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Automatic Stay 1]; Frank R. Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the
New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. McH. J.L. REF. 1 (1978) [hereinafter Kennedy, Automatic
Stay Il]. Professor Kennedy traces the origins of the stay to the farm debtor relief acts
signed by President Hoover. Kennedy, Automatic Stay I, at 179 (referring to ch. 240,
§ 75(0), 47 Stat. 1467, 1473 (1933)). Although short-lived, this proto-stay was to be the
model by which several subsequent legislative stays were constructed. The power and scope
of the stay were gradually broadened to protect larger classes of debtors from larger classes
of creditors. Id. at 179-89.
55 The nature of the stay is treated in detail in parts VI.A.1 & VI.A.2.
56 For an excellent analysis of the importance of the automatic stay in bankruptcy, see
Robert A. Johnson & Marilyn C. O'Leary, Automatic Stay Provii'ons oftthe Bankruptcy Act
of 1978, 13 N.M. L. REv. 599 (1983) (tailored to the New Mexico practitioner, but
nonetheless a well thought-out analysis). See also Richard F. Broude, The Automatic Stay,
C867 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 379 (1993); Daniel Keating, Offensive Uses oftthe Bankruptcy Stay, 45
VAND. L. REv. 71 (1992); Kennedy, Automatic Stay I, 190-210; Jeffrey Sapir, Automatic
Stay, in HANDLING YOUR FIRST PERSONAL BANKRUiTcY 1992, at 149 (PLI Com. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-641, Order No. A4-4396); Stephen W. Seifert &
Caroline C. Fuller, Annulment of the Automatic Stay, 20 CoLo. LAw. 1811 (1991);
Sommer, supra note 13, at 50.
57 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). It does not matter if the case is a voluntary or
involuntary one. Thus, creditors who are capable of bringing an involuntary petition must
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against a creditor. 58 Except as otherwise provided in Section C below, the stay
remains in effect until the property in question is no longer property of the
estate59 or until the bankruptcy case is closed, dismissed, or discharge is
granted or denied. 60
B. Who and What Is Covered by the Stay
As previously mentioned, the stay operates against all entities. 61
"Entity"-as defined by the Code-includes any "person, estate, trust,
governmental unit, and [the] United States trustee." 62 This assertion is,
however, an overstatement, as the debtor is not stayed from acting once the
petition has been filed.63 In addition, actions taken by a "governmental unit to
enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power" are not stayed. 64
Governmental units are also not stayed when issuing a notice of tax
deficiency. 65 In-depth examination of the exceptions is beyond the scope of this
Note, but § 362(b) should be read carefully to determine what exceptions may
also apply.66
also realize that by so doing, they will implement a device that keeps them in check. See
BLUM, supra note 9, § 16.3.5 8 Martin, supra note 52, at 530 (stating that the stay is effective "[w]ithout formal
service of process"); see also In re Davis, 74 B.R. 406, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In
re Garcia, 23 B.R. 266, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
59 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) (1994). For example, if property originally thought to be
property of the bankruptcy estate is deemed exempt under § 522, the automatic stay is lifted
in regard to said property. This does not mean that the creditors can now pursue the
property unchecked, however, as such property is then protected under the guise of § 522
during the scope of the bankruptcy and by § 524 thereafter.
60 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2) (1994).
61 "A petition filed under the Bankruptcy Code operates as a stay pursuant to 11 USCS
§ 362(a) applicable to all entities, including the Federal Government." Jondavid S. Delong,
Annotation, Federal Government's Liability for Damages Under 11 USCS § 362(h) for
Wilfid Violation ofAutomatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 117 A.L.R. FED. 1, 1 (1994).
62 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (1994).
63 Carley Capital Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 889 F.2d 1126, 1127 (1989).
64 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1994).
65 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9) (1994). For more on the interface between bankruptcy and
the IRS, see infra notes 149, 150 and accompanying text.
66 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) has on its face 18 exceptions (subsections), including but not
limited to alimony or paternity actions, § 362(b)(2)(A)i) & (i), presenting or protesting the
dishonor of negotiable instruments, § 362(b)(11), and a demand for tax returns,
§ 362(b)(9)(C).
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Note that the protection power of § 362(a) runs towards debtors and
estates, not creditors and other interested parties. 67 Otherwise, it would lead to
the ridiculous result of the Code staying its own proceedings. 68 Protection may
extend to parties other than the debtor, but only to the extent that an action
against those parties would affect property of the estate. 69
Thus, in order for an action to be covered by the stay, it generally must be
one that affects the bankruptcy estate70 or the debtor71 directly.72 Any interest,
legal or equitable, a debtor has in property is eligible to be property of the
estate and is therefore subject to the automatic stay.73 Section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code dictates what is property of the estate and should be carefully
scrutinized. 74
67 Bryce v. Sivers (In re Sivers), 31 B.R. 735, 735 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1983). Co-
owners of property with the debtor therefore have no standing to claim a violation of the
automatic stay when the bankruptcy trustee sells the property. Magnoni v. Globe Inv. &
Loan Co. (In re Globe Inv. & Loan Co.), 867 F.2d 556, 560 (9th Cir. 1989).
68 In fact, other proceedings brought by the debtor are generally not stayed. Schwartz
v. United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1992).
69 Compare Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't See., Inc. v. Jefferson Invest. Corp., 797
F.2d 227, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the automatic stay does not affect co-
defendants in another judicial proceeding) with Bleak v. United States, 817 F.2d 1368 (9th
Cir. 1987) (holding that actions against nondebtor may be stayed if the result of such actions
would in effect be a judgment against the debtor).
70 "The automatic stay, as its name suggests, serves as a restraint only on acts to gain
possession or control over property of the estate." United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d
1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048 (1992).
71 Some parts of § 362(a) protect not only the estate, but the debtor as an individual.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (staying the enforcement of judgments against the debtor);
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (staying acts to collect, assess, or recover claims against the debtor);
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(8) (staying the commencement or continuation of United States Tax
Court proceedings against the debtor).
72 Rare exceptions exist. For example, "in very limited situations[,] a Section 362 stay
may apply to actions against nonbankrupt defendants... if extension of the stay contributes
to the debtor's efforts of rehabilitation or the debtor and nonbankrupt are closely related."
Garrity v. Hospital Consultants, Inc. (In re Neuman), 128 B.R. 333, 336-37 (Bankr. S.D.
N.Y. 1991).
73 See, e.g., Chart House, Inc. v. Maxwell (In re Maxwell), 40 B.R. 231 (Bankr.
N.D. III. 1984) (holding that if the debtor is a tenant in possession under an expired lease,
she still maintains a slight equitable interest which is protected by the automatic stay).
74 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
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C. Suppression of the Stay
Suppression of the automatic stay can occur in one of three ways: (1) a
statutorily determined exception to the automatic stay applies; 75 (2) a party
applies for and receives permission from the bankruptcy court to commit what
would otherwise be considered a violation of the stay;76 or (3) the party failed
to apply for relief and committed an act that is covered by the stay, but such act
is subsequently ratified by the court.77 I will briefly examine the latter two
cases here.
Prior to the 1994 Amendments, the Bankruptcy Code indicated two
instances when a party might apply for and be granted suppression of the
automatic stay.78 In the first, if the party requesting relief can demonstrate
inadequate protection, 79 the stay may be suppressed.80 Second, if the debtor
has no equity in property which is not necessary for a reorganization, the stay
may also be lifted.81
75 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1994); see supra part ImI.B.
76 "On request of a party in interest... the court shall grant relief from the stay...
by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay.... ." 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)
(1994).
77 Id. While technically any order for relief under § 362 is entitled "relief" from the
stay, henceforth I will use the term in a much more limited sense, i.e., only those instances
when the stay is suppressed before the creditor acts. For instances when the creditor has
acted prior to an order, I use the terms "annulment" and "ratification" interchangeably.
When referring generally to both relief and annulment, I will use the term "suppression."
78 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994).
79 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1994) ("for cause, including the lack of adequate protection
of an interest in property of such party in interest"). Adequate protection, when called for in
the statute, is provided for in § 361. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1994).
80 This is a codification of the Supreme Court's holding in Wright v. Union Central
Life Insurance Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940). Amongst the myriad of writings discussing
adequate protection, see especially William J. Wahoff, The Adequate Protection of Secured
Cre&tors in Terination of Stay Litigation Under the Banknptcy Code, 43 OHIo ST. L.J.
715 (1982). Note that this is the opposite of what a party seeking an injunction must do, and
is reminiscent of equity. See infra part VI.A.1.
81 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1994) (providing "with respect to a stay of an act against
property... of this section, if-(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property;
and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization .... "); see David W.
Meadows, Bankruptcy Code Section 362(d)(2): Protecting Turnkey Sale Values in
Liquidations Under the Bankruptcy Code, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 893 (1988).
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Finally, in 1994, the legislature codified the holding in the single-asset real
estate cases, 82 that a debtor who has substantially all income derived from a
single, real property may be subject to an earlier suppression of the stay with
respect to that property than other debtors without such a limited income. 83
These qualifications apply regardless of whether the party is applying for relief
or annulment of the stay.
It is my contention, however, that there is a fundamental difference
between relief from the stay and annulment of the stay. This distinction will
become important when we examine the void and voidable doctrines. First,
though, it is appropriate to briefly examine both relief and annulment here.
1. Terminating,... Modi fying, or Conditioning
Creditors who wish to pursue property of a debtor contemplating
bankruptcy face a difficult choice. If they act prepetition, there is the possibility
that the action may not be complete before the petition is filed-when the
automatic stay intervenes.84 Such an action might turn out to be a waste of the
creditor's time, because if relief is not granted, the action will have been for
naught (it will not improve that creditor's position to show that they actively
pursued their rights).8 5
If instead the creditor waits for the petition, such an event may never
occur, and the waiting time will be time lost.86 Regardless of the choice made,
once a petition is filed, the stay applies, and the creditor must apply to the court
to begin or continue any action.8 7 Upon such an application, if the court finds
that one of the three elements of § 362(d) has been met, the court then has the
discretion whether or not to terminate, modify, or condition the stay.88 Nothing
82 See, e.g., United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365
(1988).
83 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (1994); see Mark N. Polebaum & Erik P. Kimball, Single
Asset Real Estate Reorganizations, C784 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 551 (1992).
84 In addition, should the action be completed, it may still be avoidable under
fraudulent transfer laws. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
85 The bankruptcy court is a court of equity and as such has broad powers to value
claims. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 134 (1881). Even so, courts "classify claims, not
creditors." DOUGLAS G. BAiRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 247 n.6 (rev. ed. 1993).
Therefore, the creditor's actions have no effect on the valuation of an otherwise valid claim.
86 And, in the interim, another creditor may act successfully.
87 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
88 This is to say that the court has the choice of what form of relief to grant. If the
requirements of § 362(d) are met, however, the court may not in its discretion refuse to
grant relief. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) ("On request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay .... ") (emphasis added).
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in the court's decision to do any of the preceding affects the nature of the act
itself, as the act has not yet been committed.
2. Annulment
What if the creditor acts without knowledge of the stay's existence or
scope? Such acts are under the scope of § 362. Notification is not an element of
the stay.89 The creditor is not without remedy, however. Creditors, upon a
showing of one of the elements of § 362(d), may still have the court annul the
stay for the offending act.90
Although annulment of the stay finds its source in the same Code section as
the other forms of relief, it is inherently different than those other remedies. 91
While termination, modification, or conditioning the stay all change the nature
of the stay, annulment does not affect the stay at all; it changes the nature of the
act. The stay remains in effect and unchanged for all other acts.
D. Violations of the Automatic Stay
"The consequences of violating the automatic stay... are set forth in
§ 362(h), which provides that: '[A]n individual injured by any willful violation
of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs
and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive
damages.'" 92 Note that § 362(h) provides for damages in the case of wil/id
violations towards individual debtors. In the case of inadvertent violations of
the stay, § 362(h) will not apply.
It is also commonly accepted that partnerships, corporations, and other
legal entities are not eligible to receive damages under § 362(h). 93 It is
89 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
90 It is also possible the court may grant relief that does not easily fit into any of the
four aforementioned types of relief. The language of § 362(d) implies that these
categories-termination, modification, conditioning, and annulment-are only suggestions,
i.e., "the court shall grant relief from the stay... such as by .... ." (emphasis added).
91 For a more in-depth analysis of annulments of the automatic stay, see Seifert &
Fuller, supra note 56, at 1811.
92 In re Holman, 92 B.R. 764, 767-68 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(h) (1978, as amended)). "[An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees,
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages." 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)
(1994).
93 The argument is a convincing one, that is, 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) defines person as
being either an "individual, partnership, [or] corporation." Thus, by implication, being an
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therefore necessary, both in the instance of inadvertent stay violations and non-
human debtors, that the debtor seek remedy outside of § 362(h) via a contempt
order.
The bankruptcy court has wide powers under § 105 to "issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title." 94 Thus, even though an action may not be subject to
statutory damages, either because of the nature of the action or the nature of the
debtor, the court may still fashion other forms of relief. It is not clear whether
the court can apply both § 362(h) damages and § 105 relief to a single action,
but the need for this dual remedy seems small.
IV. THE VOID/VOIDABLE DOCTRINES
Black's Law Dictionary discusses the differences between void and
voidable doctrines by saying the following:
There is this difference between the two words "void" and "voidable": void in
the strict sense means that an instrument or transaction is nugatory and ineffectual
so that nothing can cure it; voidable exists when an imperfection or defect can be
cured by the act or confirmation of him who could take advantage of it.95
The void/voidable distinction is not peculiar to bankruptcy proceedings. It
also occurs in several disparate areas of the law. It is, therefore, a useful
exercise to examine the two doctrines separately outside of bankruptcy, in
particular in the law of contracts, before examining the bankruptcy issues.
A. Void
The crucial element of the identification of an act as void is that the act is
in violation of some legal principle and is incurable.96 Contracts may be void
for one of two reasons: (1) the elements of an enforceable contract have not
individual means not being one of the others. See Arturo G. Hernandez, Note, 11 U.S. C
§ 362(h): Congressional Answer to the Bankruptcy Abuse of Consuner Creditors, 56 OHIO
ST. L.J. 617, 627 (1995).
94 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
95 BLACK'S LAW DIcrioNARY 1573 (6th ed. 1990).
96 A void instrument has been defined as an instrument or transaction which is wholly
ineffective, inoperative, and incapable of ratification and thus has no force or effect "so that
nothing can cure it." In re Oliver, 38 B.R. 245, 247 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (quoting
BLACK'S LAWDICrIONARY 1411 (5th ed. 1979)).
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been completed, 97 or (2) the elements are achieved, but the contract is
culturally undesirable. 98 What the two cases have in common is that no amount
of first aid by the parties-or the court-can heal them. In the latter case, an
illegal contract cannot be ratified by the court. 99 Changing the bargain to
eliminate the illegality, for example, simply results in a separate, enforceable
contract. The same is true for the former-change begets a new and different
contract. 10 Thus, when a transaction is deemed void, or void ab initio, it is as
if the transaction did not occur. There can be no legal redress for the
occurrence (unless there is specific statutory treatment), as the act is otherwise
legally deemed to never have occurred. 101
B. Voidable
In the case of a voidable act, such an act is no less in violation of legal
principles than those acts which are simply void. 102 The difference is that in the
case of a voidable act, courts generally let sleeping dogs lie; that is, they leave
the contract alone unless a party objects.103 If a merchant makes a contract for
a non-necessity with a minor, for example, courts will let the contract stand
unless the minor objects. 104 The minor may disaffirm the contract, but in so
doing, the entire contract is avoided, not just the portions inconvenient to the
97 For example, a contract may be considered void for lack of consideration. A
promise to pay a pension for services already rendered is void for lack of consideration, as
past consideration is insufficient to bind a promisor. Plowman v. Indian Ref. Co., 20
F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1937). See generally E. ALLAN FARNswoRTH, CONTRACTS §§ 2.3-
2.15 (2d ed. 1990).
98 "Parties cannot make a binding contract in violation of law or of public policy."
Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 763, 764 (N.Y. 1902). Such contracts
are void. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 97, at 345-90.
9 9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONRACTS § 179 (1979).
100 Id. §§ 7, 12, 14.
101 This becomes more important when we examine the procedural consequences of
stay violations. See infra part VI.
102 The term "voidable" has been defined as that which may be avoided, or declared
void; not absolutely void, or void in itself. It imports "a valid act which may be avoided as
opposed to an invalid act that may be ratified." United States v. Price, 514 F. Supp. 477,
480 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
103 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 97, § 4.4.
104 The classic case in this realm is in actuality a tort action, couched in contract-like
theories. Brunhoelzl v. Brandes, 100 A. 163, 163 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1917) (holding a minor not
subject to tort liability in the bailment of an automobile).
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minor. 105 Voidable acts may also be ratified, that is, the power to disaffirm
may be surrendered. 106
V. THE PLAIN MEANING APPROACH TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Legislative interpretation is always a tricky thing. 10 7 Competing theories
abound, and choosing among them would be nearly impossible without
guidance from the legislature or the courts.108 Recently, the Supreme Court has
taken a very straightforward approach to interpreting statutes, °9 and
correspondingly the Bankruptcy Code. Under the direction of Justice Scalia,
the Rehnquist Court has adopted a strict textual approach to deconstructing
statutory meaning, and this approach has received both praise and criticism
within the bankruptcy community."I 0
The problem with textualism is generally not the theory itself, but rather
many academics' misunderstanding of the theory."'I Justice Thomas sums it up
best: "When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is
105 FARNSWORTH, supra note 97, § 4.4, at 231.
106 Id. § 4.4, at 232.
107 "Perhaps the most omnipresent jargon in modem society is that of the
bureaucrat .... [The really important question is why bureaucratic prose so often fits the
pungent term (coined by the Texas Congressman Maury Maverick) 'gobbledygook.'"
ROBERT CLAIBORNE, OUR MARVELOUS NATIVE TONGUE: THE LiFE AND TIMES OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 276 (1983).
108 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
109 See, e.g., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)
(holding that the statute giving the courts of appeals jurisdiction over, inter alia, appeals
from all final orders of district courts sitting as appellate courts in bankruptcy, did not limit
interlocutory review statute by negative implication); United States v. Ron Pair Enters.,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989) (evincing a marked reluctance to look beyond the plain
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code when interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)).
I10 See C. Robert Morris, Bankrupt Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order
of Illusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REv. 265 (1992); Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M.
Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRAcusE L. REV. 823 (1991); see also Kelch, supra note 6.
111 For example, the one author who has mentioned the theory in connection with the
void/voidable debate does so only in passing. Robert R. Niccolini, Note, The Voidability of
Actions Taken in Violation of the Automatic Stay: Application of the Infonmation-Fordng
Paradigm, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1663, 1677 (1992). The note analyzes the void/voidable
debate in terms of the so-called "information forcing paradigm" of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Id. at 1674-76. What Mr. Niccolini does not seem to
realize is that the theory is the beginning and end of the analysis--economic theories are
unnecessary when the plain meaning is clear. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying
text.
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also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'" '112 Inherent in this statement is that
plain meaning is applied at the outset. If it is conclusive, then the analysis ends.
If it is not, then the courts may look to other factors. Probably one of the best
inquiries into the first and subsequent steps is done by Professor Thomas
Kelch. 113 Although Professor Kelch has provided what may be considered the
definitive rule for plain meaning analyses, his rule is subject to the same
problems of interpretation as the statutes themselves. Another scholar has taken
the same methodology used by Professor Kelch, but has broken it into "six
realms of relevance, each progressively more inclusive and farther removed
from the literal meaning of the code section in question." 114 Although not
expressly stated by the author, one assumes that the methodology involves
applying the stages in linear fashion, and terminating the inquiry whenever a
particular stage yields definitive results. In such a case, the later stages are not
examined, no matter how useful they may appear to be.115 The six stages in
question are as follows:
(1) One subsection's language in a vacuum.
(2) Similar or dissimilar usage in the same section.
(3) Similar or dissimilar usage across different sections.
(4) The policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code.
(5) The goals of other statutes, both federal and state.
(6) A consideration of equities of the matter.116
Note that simply because these steps are stated in this manner does not
mean that they are mutually exclusive. If, for example, Congress specifically
examined the equities of the matter in the legislative history of the statute, then
this examination will occur at step four, not step six.
112 Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (Thomas, I.) (quoting
Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
113 "Interpretation of a statute shall be controlled by the [o]rdinary Imleaning of the
language of the statute to the [rleader, including the [ilntemal [clontext of the statute, except
where such interpretation would lead to a result not in conformance with reason." Kelch,
supra note 6, at 311-12. Each of the formerly capitalized terms in Professor Kelch's
definition are separately defined in the article.
114 Effross, supra note 7, at 1749 ("Each level of this inquiry, contains inherent
ambiguities and contradictions.").
115 This is consistent with Justice Thomas's comments in Geminan. Gennain, 503 U.S.
at 254.
116 Effross, supra note 7, at 1749-54 (modified from the original text).
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As stated, this six-part test encourages Congress to legislate within the
previously accepted legal terminology, and not to create new and specific
jargon if unnecessary. This resolution supports legislative economy, and
prevents overreaching judicial activism when given blank slates on which to
write.
VI. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE N BANKRUPTCY
Bankruptcy scholars may wonder why the void/voidable distinction
persists, when the Supreme Court has already spoken on the issue. In Kalb v.
Feuerstein,117 the appellants had a petition pending in the bankruptcy court, yet
two creditors forced a judicial sale in state court.118 Appellants made no
application to the bankruptcy court or state court for a stay of the foreclosure or
of the subsequent action to enforce it.119 Before the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
appellants argued that the stay under the Bankruptcy Act then in effect was self-
executing.' 20 The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this argument,
determining the bankruptcy stay to be judicial (thus requiring an application to
the court) as opposed to statutory (which would require no application).121
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the bankruptcy stay to
be automatic, "a peremptory prohibition by Congress in the exercise of its
supreme power over bankruptcy." 122 The Court considered the state court's
order of judicial sale void, as it violated the automatic operation of the
bankruptcy stay.123 While this is indeed persuasive authority, it is not binding.
The Feuerstein Court held as it did by interpreting the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Act.' 24 The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and subsequent
repeal of the Act render the Feuerstein opinion inapplicable. Even so, the
majority of the circuits are still persuaded by the Feuerstein holding, with one
117 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
118 Id. at 435-36.
119 Id. at 436.
120 Id. at 437.
121 Id.
12 2 Id. at 439.
123 But if appellants are right in their contention that the [Bankruptcy] Act of itself,
from the moment the petition was filed and so long as it remained pending, operated, in
the absence of the bankruptcy court's consent, to oust the jurisdiction of the state court
so as to stay its power to proceed with foreclosure, to confirm a sale, and to issue an
order ejecting appellants from their farm, the action of the Walwoth County Court was
not merely erroneous but was beyond its power, void, and subject to collateral attack.
Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
124 Id. at 439 (interpreting the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544).
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major exception, the Fifth Circuit. 125 Thus, the distinction remains alive in the
federal courts.
The void/voidability distinction has been identified as a significant concern
by several authors in the bankruptcy field. 126 One fairly recent essay chose to
analyze the debate in terms of the "information-forcing paradigm." 127 This
paradigm is the logic behind the well-known contracts dispute in Hadley v.
Baxendale.128 In Hadley, the court reasoned that had the plaintiff wanted to
insure the defendant's prompt action, the plaintiff would have informed the
defendant of the damages that arise from delay. In so holding, the court
established a principle that forced the complaining party to fully inform others
of special circumstance from which conflicts might arise. The author of that
essay finds support for the voidable theory of stay violations in this theory.129
It is his contention that the treatment of stay violations as voidable will
encourage the debtor to fully inform others of the bankruptcy filing rather than
sitting back and relying on the absolute protection of the competing void
doctrine. 30
Regardless of whether we choose to adopt this "information-forcing" view
of bankruptcy policy, we are still faced with a difficult question: If relief from
the automatic stay can be granted (but has not been petitioned for), and the
creditor acts in violation of the stay, should the court apply a weighing doctrine
(i.e., would the court have granted relief if properly asked for) or should the
court invalidate the action outright? The former is treating the actions as
voidable, the latter as void. 131
125 See Picco v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1990)
("[Aictions taken in violation of an automatic stay are not void .... ") (citing Sikes v.
Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1989)). Despite the consistent holdings of
the other circuits that stay violations are void, district courts still struggle with this issue.
See, e.g., In re Clark, 79 B.R. 723,725 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
126 Niccolini, supra note 111, at 1663; Stephen W. Sather, Tax Issues in Bankruptcy,
25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1363, 1393 (1994) ("A split of authority presently exists as to whether
actions taken in violation of the stay are void or merely voidable.").
127 Niccolini, supra note 111, at 1663.
128 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (holding a carrier, ignorant of the potential
for damages, not liable for the mill-client's damages suffered when the carrier failed to
promptly deliver the mill's crankshaft for repair).
129 Niccolini, supra note 111, at 1679.
130 Id.
131 Broude, supra note 56, at 438 ("Why... if all acts violating the stay are void,
does § 362(d) give the courts the power to annul the stay? The issue may be ripe for
reexamination.").
1996]
OHIO STATELAWJOURAL
Although nothing in § 362 speaks of either void or voidable acts, we may
still examine the pivotal term stay under the plain meaning methodology. Step
one in the plain-meaning approach is to examine the subsection's language in a
vacuum. 132 Nothing in § 362 speaks of either void or voidable acts. We can
determine the meaning of stay at this level by two methods: (1) an analysis of
the specific meaning of stay in legal practice, i.e., an analysis of the explicit
meaning of the term; or (2) inferring the meaning of stay by examining the
other words of the subsection, i.e., an analysis of the implicit meaning of the
term.
A. Explication
According to at least one author, in bankruptcy, stays are injunctive in
nature. 133 Whether this contention is based upon fact or on theory is unclear.
Investigation into the history of stays leads to two possibilities: equity or
moratory.
1. The Case for Equity
Historically, equity described those remedies that arose from England's
Court of Chancery. In particular, the chancellor was looked to as a source of
fairness when courts of law failed to do justice.134 Traditional remedies include
injunctions, restraining orders, and contract remedies such as specific or
substitutional relief. Although many of today's equitable remedies can be traced
to the historical courts of England, many cannot. Equity today "denotes the
spirit and habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the
intercourse" of persons with one another. 135 The purposes of the stay discussed
above, including protection of the debtor from unfair predatory behavior of the
creditor, seem consistent with this fairness-based equity theory.
The problem with an equitable approach to stay litigation is that there is
more about stays that is inconsistent with equity than is consistent. Traditional
equitable remedies were granted when a party had already experienced some
harm that law would not repair. In the case of the automatic stay, protection is
granted before any such harm has occurred. One traditional equitable remedy
132 Effross, supra note 7, at 1749.
133 BLUM, supra note 9, § 16.1.
134 One commentator suggests that the original injunction arose when a court of
chancery enjoined the enforcement of a law court's judgment because of fraud. Janet
Napolitano, Injunctions in the Nineties, LrrIG., Spring 1991, at 23.
13 5 BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990); see also HAROLD G. HANBURY &
RONALD H. MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQUrrY 732-34 (fill E. Martin ed., 13th ed. 1989).
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still in use in England, the injunction quia timet, is granted in the apprehension
of irreparable harm. 136 American courts recognize the validity of such
injunctions, but like the British courts, hold them in disfavor. 137
In addition to this difference in timing, there is also a difference between
stays and injunctions in the burdens of the parties before the court. Traditional
injunctions were granted on a showing of irreparable harm to the protected
party. There is no automatic application of injunctions; their exercise is within
the discretion of the court. In cases where such a showing would take too long,
a temporary restraining order could be granted by the court. In the bankruptcy
automatic stay, no showing is required-harm is presumed. Instead, the party
seeking suppression of the stay is charged with showing no irreparable harm.
Therefore, stays differ from injunctions in both the immediacy of the
application and the shifting of burdens on the parties involved.
Even so, if we were to equate the bankruptcy stay with injunctive-type
relief, it is still unclear whether actions in violation of injunctive orders are
void or voidable. One suspects that they would be voidable, as the nature of
equity would seem to require a balancing of the factors in each individual case.
It is evident that a determination of an equity-based theory of stays will not
resolve the void/voidable debate. Therefore, it is necessary to look to another
possible source of the bankruptcy stay-moratory laws.
2. Moratory Laws
Debtor protection has not always been federal, and even when federal, it
has not always arisen solely out of bankruptcy laws. 138 The characterization of
stays as arising out of equity has some merit, but it is also very likely that stays
136 F.H. LAWSON, REMEDIES OFENGLISH LAW 188-89 (2d ed. 1980).
137 "Courts [are] extremely reluctant to issue injunctions... before the commission of
a wrong.... [T]hey require very strong evidence to show that it will occur if they do not
act." Id. at 189. For an example of these injunctions in American courts, see Escrow
Agents' Fidelity Corp. v. Superior Court., 4 Cal. App. 4th 491, 493 (1994) ("Although
quia timet has by and large been abandoned in favor of other legal and equitable pre-
judgment remedies, it is by no means obsolete."). Injunctions quia timet are now almost
exclusively relegated to the law of suretyship. See Jay M. Mann & Curtis A. Jennings, Quia
7Ymet: A Remedy for the Fearful Surety, 20 FORUM 685 (1985).
138 Even today, debtors may look to other federal laws for assistance. Laws such as
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994), are enacted under the
authority of the federal Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3. See S. REP. No.
382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695.
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in general are offspring of the emergency war-time moratory legislation.13 9
Moratory legislation is crisis-based legislation 4° that acts to prevent certain
types of creditor action in times of war.
Several authorities have equated the legal use of stays with moratory
laws. 141 The import of such an association is not immediately clear, for as with
the case of equity, it is unclear what is the legal nature of moratory violations.
One might assume that the same exigencies that motivate moratory legislation
would also motivate subscribing to a void theory. 142
As in the case of equity, moratory laws do not definitively allow for a
determination of either the void or voidability of stay violations. Before
abandoning the plain meaning analysis of stays at this first level (subsection in
a vacuum), it is still necessary to determine if the other words of the subsection
aid in interpreting the term in question.
B. Implication
While there appears to be no clear way to determine the explicit meaning
of the term "stay," the meaning of the stay within § 362 can still be determined
by implication. 143 The Fifth Circuit opinion in Picco v. Global Marine Drilling
Co. 144 is an excellent example of definition by implication. In Picco, the court
held that "actions taken in violation of an automatic stay are not void, but
rather that they are merely voidable, because the bankruptcy court has the
power to annul the automatic stay pursuant to section 362(d)."1 45 This is
consistent with the earlier discussion of the nature of void and voidable acts,
i.e., that which is void is void ab initio, and incapable of cure. 146 By the fact
139 For an excellent early history of moratory laws, see A.H. Feller, Moratory
Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1061 (1933). See also In re Purdy's
Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d 38, 44 (1947); Kirschner v. Cohn, 58 N.Y.S.2d 561, 561-62 (1945).
140 Much like the earlier American attempts at bankruptcy legislation. See supra part
II.
141 See BALLENTINE'S LAw DICrIONARY 1215 (3d ed. 1969); see also Brown v. State
Nat'l Bank, 271 P. 833, 834 (Okla. 1927).
142 For example, judicial economy in a time when all resources are scarce. Feller,
supra note 139, at 1064.
143 This is still within the first three steps of the plain meaning approach, i.e., analysis
of the plain meaning of the subsection, section, or Code without resorting to legislative
approach. See supra part V.
144 900 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1990).
145 Id. at 850 (emphasis omitted) (citing Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176,
178 (5th Cir. 1989)).
146 supra part IV.
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that § 362(a) allows the court to cure the stay violation, such violations must be
implicitly voidable.
VII. CONCLUSION
By applying the Supreme Court's plain meaning approach to legislative
interpretation, we have seen that despite an ambiguous legislative history,
violations of § 362 must be treated as voidable. The ramifications of such a
treatment are twofold: procedural and actual.
The procedural difference in the treatment is that if the action is treated as
voidable, it falls upon the debtor to bring an action to set aside the action. 147
This presents no additional burden on bankruptcy debtors, because even in void
jurisdictions, cautious debtors' attorneys ask the court for a declaratory ruling
that an action is void. 148 For those contemplating action, the differing
treatments could simply resolve to one of procedure. (If an action is treated as
void, but essentially the action would have been granted relief if properly
requested, voiding it will only cause the creditor to request relief, then commit
the action again.) This is no different from the voidable treatment except for
requiring strict adherence to the procedure. Thus, the conclusion that stay
violations are voidable may even present a lesser burden.
Other than the procedural issue, if the action is treated as voidable (and
therefore curable), the issue of damages becomes moot if the action is cured. If,
however, the action is void or incurable, the damages become crucial,
especially in the case of the IRS, recognized by academics and practitioners as
one of the most blatant violators of the automatic stay. 149 As the Code has a
built-in waiver of sovereign immunity, if the goal of bankruptcy is to protect
the debtor, and if actions are truly void, then we should be subjecting the IRS
to these damages. 150
147 Or in certain instances, the trustee can exercise its power under § 549 to avoid
postpetition transfers of property. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1994).
148 Of course, as per the previous discussion of the legal import of void acts, no ruling
need be obtained, the action is void as a matter of course. Risk-takers may indeed rely on
such a policy, but such a reliance borders on malpractice. An attorney who relies on the
voidness of an act without consulting the bench may find that the act is not void too late
(perhaps an exception to § 362 applied).
149 Sather, supra note 126, at 1393 ("Occasionally, the IRS violates the automatic
stay."). One wonders if Mr. Sather was being audited when he expressed this sentiment so
weakly.
150 Section 106(c) of Title 11 expressly provides that any provisions containing the
terms "creditor," "entity," or "governmental unit" apply to governmental units and that
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By treating such acts as voidable, the difficulty of void treatment
disappears. That is, if a void act is treated as if it never occurred, one should
not be able to receive common law (i.e., equitable) damages. Damages, other
than statutory damages, cannot stem from an act which is treated as never
having occurred. Therefore, the conclusion that stay violations are voidable
may actually increase the judicial remedies available to the debtor.
Thus, it is clear that by applying the Supreme Court's rationale, stay
violations are voidable and thus curable. In addition, while it is essential to the
nature of a plain meaning approach that extrinsic factors such as legislative
history or general policy concerns not be consulted if the plain meaning is
clear, it is also apparent that by following a strict plain meaning approach the
debtor may actually be afforded more protection, not less.
a determination by the court of an issue arising under such a provision binds the
governmental unit. Thus, courts may bind taxing jurisdictions in matters concerning the
automatic stay.
Sather, supra note 126, at 1392-93 (1994) (footnote omitted). "A governmental unit... is
deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to a claim against such
governmental unit that is property of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence out of which the claim of such governmental unit claim arose." 11 U.S.C.
§ 106(b) (1994).
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